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The purpose of this essay is to give Fichte the chance to answer back. I shall not attempt to address every element of Hegel's critique, and indeed I shall here bypass some of the issues that others have made central to the Fichte-Hegel divergence. (In particular I shall have nothing directly to say here about the charge of subjective idealism, which has been much discussed in this connection.) I
focus instead on what Hegel himself clearly marks as the major thrust of his critique: the allegation that Fichte "betrays the principle of subject-object identity." I propose to treat this objection in the context of the Hegelian notion of Bad Infinity (schlechte Unendlichkeit). Though the term "bad infinity" does not in fact occur in the Differenzschrift, I shall argue that this influential Hegelian concept is indeed at work there, and moreover that the central force of Hegel's objection to Fichte revolves around the allegation that Fichte is, as I shall put it, a philosopher of the bad infinite.
My discussion proceeds in two main parts. The first two sections of the paper are mainly expository and historical. In §1 I introduce the Hegelian account of Bad Infinity, exhibiting the main elements of the logic of this concept by drawing on its canonical treatment in the later editions of The Science of Logic. In §2 I turn to its critical role in Hegel's Fichte-Critique. I show that, despite the absence of this term from Hegel's Differenzschrift, the concept of Bad Infinity is indeed first formulated in that work and that Hegel's anti-Fichtean argument effectively revolves around it. The second part of the paper then engages the controversy. In §3 I consider how Fichte could have responded to the Hegelian charge, and how in turn a Hegelian might press his objection in light of the Fichtean reply I propose. I shall argue that the disputed issues quickly come to settle on an cluster of problems about what I shall call "Bad Infinite Ideals" -ideals which purportedly retain their authority despite remaining in principle beyond the reach of finite human endeavor -and I consider the divergence between a Fichtean and Hegelian approach to such ideals. In the final section I argue that neither side emerges with a clear victory in this dispute. In this sense the present paper is inconclusive, but my hope is that enacting the controversy may itself prove illuminating both historically and philosophically. I conclude with a few provisional remarks about how to proceed in the light of such a stalemate. §1 The Logic of Bad Infinity
The term Bad Infinity first appears in Hegel's published writings in the Science of Logic, where it plays a central role. I begin with a brief survey of Hegel's discussion there, not with an eye to plumbing the considerable complexity of his treatment of infinity, but rather with the aim of providing a preliminary plotting of the distinctive shape of this influential Hegelian concept. In the Science of Logic, Hegel's discussion of infinity opens with a distinction:
The infinite, however, is held to be absolute without qualification for it is determined expressly as the negation of the absolute. … But even so, the infinite is not yet really free from limitation and finitude; the main point is to distinguish the genuine 3 Notion of infinity from the bad infinite, the infinity of reason from the infinity of the understanding. (SL 137 2 )
Here already we can see Hegel's introduction of the contrast that will concern us. The infinite admits of these two interpretations, dubbed by Hegel as "echt" and "schlecht" respectively; an adequate probing of the logic of infinitude must learn to distinguish quite sharply between the two.
Straightaway translation issues impose themselves on our discussion. The term "schlecht" is the standard German equivalent to the English word "bad," and I have thus far simply followed this common equivalence. Many of Hegel's recent translators, however, have rendered "schlecht" rather as "spurious," presumably because it is here introduced in contrast with "echt" --the genuine or true infinity. As we shall soon find, quite a lot comes to ride on the choice between these two translations.
To think and speak of schlecht Unendlichkeit as bad infinity is to think of it as a variety of infinity, albeit a variety that is bad. The sense in which infinity could be bad remains to be specified, but already with such an approach one has in certain fundamental respects prejudged the issues. A bad dog is a dog, a bad painting is a painting, so bad infinity would itself presumably be a form of infinitude.
On the other hand, to speak and think instead of spurious infinity is to prejudge the issues in a different direction. For spurious infinity is presumably not really infinite; "spurious" suggests a fake, a forgery or a counterfeit of some sort. For present purposes I shall simply follow the dictionary in rendering "schlecht" as "bad." But I recognize that this is not an innocent choice, and I shall propose in due course some neutral terminology in which we might construct the issues.
Hegel provides a first characterization of the bad infinite in the context of his discussion of the so-called "qualitative infinite."
The infinite as thus posited over against the finite, in a relation wherein they are as qualitatively distinct others, is to be called the bad infinite, the infinite of the understanding, for which it has the value of the highest, the absolute truth. (SL 139) This passage has the look of a definition, but it is not, for as we shall see presently there are important forms of bad infinitude that are quantitative rather than qualitative. But it nonetheless provides a first glimpse of the kind of structure that Hegel is concerned with. The very term "in-finitude" -Unendlichkeit -suggests that the concept is to be constructed as the negation of the finite. The infinite would be, on this approach, defined by its opposition to finitude, and in this sense "posited over against" it. For Hegel the exemplar of this conception is the understanding of divine infinitude inscribed in orthodox Christianity. God's infinitude, on this conception, is strictly distinguished from the finitude of God's creation, and 'posited over against it.' But perhaps the most useful characterizations of the bad infinite come in the context of 4 of bad infinitude that will shape much of his discussion. In this context Hegel's central example of Bad Infinity is not God but rather the number series. The number series is probably the most familiar and canonical example of infinitude in modern discussions; indeed we are now inclined to think of infinity as a numerical concept. 4 For Hegel such an equation is mistaken, as we will see, but nonetheless much of the conceptual structure of bad infinity comes into view when we think about the infinitude of the number line. So what do we mean when we say that the number series is infinite? In modern mathematical discussions this issue has been intensely disputed, but we can at least formulate one answer by appeal to the familiar distinction between the intensive and extensive infinitude of the series of real numbers. The real number series is extensively infinite in the sense that it has no end, no final number beyond which there are no more. And the real number series is intensively infinite insofar as it is dense with numbers: between any two one finds a third. Hence if we consider two real numbers m and n, then by the principle of extensive infinitude, m+1 is also a real number; by the principle of intensive infinitude ½(m+n) is also a real number. In both cases we tend to associate of the infinitude of numbers with the idea that, as we say, "they go on and on and on …", "there is no end to them."
In this idea of "going on and on and on" into an infinitely receding distance, we find one of the hallmarks of the bad infinite as Hegel understands it. To say that some thing is in-finite, unendlich, seems to mean that there is no getting to the end of it. One can go indefinitely far along the series -as long as one has the will and patience to go -yet one will never get to the end of the line. In contemporary thought we tend to think of this particular structure as more-or-less definitive of the notion of infinitude. When Camus writes about infinitude, he takes the labors of Sisyphus as his exemplar: struggling to push his rock up a hill again and again and again without end. 5 When Bernard Williams writes about immortality, he writes about it as a form of existence that goes on and on and on and on through time, never coming to an end. 6 When we wonder whether space is finite or infinite, we wonder in effect whether one could go on and on and on without either coming to the end of it or arriving back at where one started. For Hegel all this marks the force of Bad Infinity in structuring modern thinking about the infinite. It is for just this reason, of course, that translators have come to render Hegel's "schlecht" as "spurious." For the claim here seems to be that these familiar exemplars of infinitude are themselves not genuine infinities; they purport to be but are not infinite. In short they are counterfeit, spurious 9 Marx claims that capitalism is essentially oriented toward an incompleteable infinitude, an orientation grounded in the ontology of capital itself. See for instance this remark in Grundrisse: "A specific sum of money … can entirely suffice for a specific consumption, in which case it ceases to be money. But as a representative of general wealth, it cannot do so. As a quantitatively specific sum, a limited sum, it is only a limited representative of general wealth, or representative of a limited wealth, which goes as far, and no further than, its exchange value, and is precisely measured in it. It thus does not by any means have the capacity which according to its general concept it ought to have, namely the capacity of buying all pleasures, all commodities, the totality of the material substances of wealth … . Fixed as wealth, as the general form of wealth, as value which counts as value, it is therefore the constant drive to go beyond its quantitative limit: an endless process." Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Fichte does not attain to the idea of Reason as the perfected, real unity of subject and object, or of ego and non-ego; it is only, as with Kant, represented as the thought of a union in belief or faith, and with this Fichte likewise concludes. … For because the ego is fixed in its opposition to the non-ego, and is only as being opposed, it becomes 8 lost in that unity. The attainment of this aim is hence sent further and further back into the bad, sensuous infinitude … . 10 We can already see here that the purported flaw in Fichte's philosophical position is intimately tied up with the notion of Bad Infinity. On Hegel's pithy summary, the Bad Infinitude of Fichte's position emerges as the inescapable consequence of four elements of the Fichtean account of subjectivity (the I or Ego -"das Ich"). The first and basic point is that for Fichte, a subject is always set over against and limited by an object; the two are "fixed in opposition." 11 Secondly, because the Fichtean subject is always opposed in this way, it cannot attain what both Hegel and Fichte refer to as "subject-object unity" -a unity in which the division between subject and object is somehow superceded or overcome.
Accordingly (this is the third point), the principle of subject-object identity can figure in the Wissenschaftslehre only as a projected goal, an object of faith or obligation or striving or longing.
Finally, even though the Fichtean subject projects such a goal, the attainment of it would be incoherent and self-destructive. As Hegel puts it here: the I would lose itself in such an identity. This is simply a consequence of the initial point: if the I must be limited by a not-I, then a circumstance in which this opposition is finally overcome would also be the circumstance in which the I would cease to exist as In this famous passage we find the main thrust of the argument that would be repeated decades later in the History lectures. For Fichte, Hegel alleges, the principle of the Absolute I, or of an identity of subject and object is (a) obligatory (the I ought to have an absolute causality), (b) contradictory (since it would involve what Hegel would later call a "loss of self"), and (c) projected as an object of striving.
In this passage the language of infinitude is lacking, but the critical conclusion is unmistakable: in so configuring his account Fichte effectively fails to realize his speculative goal, and in this sense abandons his principles.
A few paragraphs later these three elements of the critical summary are completed by explicitly introducing the language of infinite progress:
This absolute opposition of Idea and intuition, and their synthesis which is nothing but a self-destructive demand, since it postulates a union which still must not happen -all this is expressed in the infinite progress. Absolute opposition is thus shoved into the form it had at a lower standpoint which had for a long time passed current as the true suspension of opposition and the highest solution of the antinomy of Reason.
Existence prolonged into eternity involves both the infinity of the Idea and intuition within itself, but in forms which make their synthesis impossible. (DZ 134)
Here we find the unmistakable anticipation of the later scornful account of "the high repute of the progress to infinity." As Hegel recognizes, the Fichtean subject is explicitly constructed as an agent which cannot attain to a goal which it also cannot give up. The Fichtean solution is to project this goal into an infinitely distant future, as a labor that can be neither avoided nor accomplished, as a defining task, and as the measure for an endeavor that can never finally measure up to its own standard. As
Hegel recognizes, for Fichte this underwrites a curious version of the traditional hope for immortality:
the Fichtean I inevitably projects its existence into an infinite eternity, for it is only such a capacious future that could accommodate the infinite task the Fichtean I has set itself. Depending on one's sympathies one might choose to describe such a figure as either tragic or absurd. But for Hegel all this is a mistake, a regress into a "lower," (i.e., non-speculative) understanding of the configuration of infinitude.
We can complete our backwards march through Hegel's corpus by revisiting the passage in which these shots were first fired -the Preface to the Differenzschrift, where Hegel's critical summary of Fichte's position is projected for the first time.
The principle of Fichte's system is the pure thinking that thinks itself, the identity of subject and object, in the form Ego=Ego.
[Here] one has the authentic principle of speculation boldly expressed. However, as soon as [Fichte' s] speculation steps outside of the concept that it establishes of itself and evolves into a system, it abandons itself and its principle and does not come back to it again. It surrenders 11 Subjectivity, for Fichte, requires self-consciousness, but self-consciousness itself always requires opposition or limitation by something other. This is the so-called Principle of Resistance spelled out in the §5 of the 1794-95
Wissenschaftslehre, and echoed later in the psychoanalytic tradition.
Reason to the intellect and passes over into the chain of finite consciousness from which it never reconstructs itself again as identity and true infinity. … Ego=Ego is transformed into the principle 'Ego ought to be equal to Ego. (DZ 81-82, emphasis added)
We can see here all the elements of the charge of Bad Infinity; all that is missing is Hegel's trademark term. Indeed in this case Hegel has even hit upon the term for its positive correlate. Fichte's subject never attains to true infinity, and hence the Wissenschaftslehre ultimately fails to vindicate the "authentic principle of speculation" which it nonetheless "boldly expresses." In the end, Hegel's criticisms of Fichte, both early and late, can be summarized in two slogans of the Differenzschrift. For In defending the Fichtean position, I propose to start by making three strategic concessions.
Firstly, I propose in effect to concede Hegel's basic distinction. I think Hegel is right to distinguish two fundamentally different forms of infinitude; indeed I think of this distinction as marking one of Hegel's most fundamental and enduring philosophical contributions. Moreover, I think Hegel is right in claiming that the model of Bad Infinity has dominated our thinking about infinitude, and that this dominance has in fundamental ways served to blind us to structures that deserve to be described as think that this is indeed a serious concern, so I want to explore this charge and see how Fichte might respond to it. Let me start by developing the objection along three interrelated lines.
The Formula of Despair. I begin with an explicitly psychological version of the objection.
We must seriously consider the psychological stability of the Fichtean subject, oriented as it is by ideals that it recognizes to be unattainable in principle and by obligations that it can never fulfill. 
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The Formula of Impossible Intentions. So expressed the Hegelian objection is cast in psychological terms, but we might well see the psychological facts as reflective of an underlying transcendental condition. The having of intentions and the setting of aims and goals is subject to conditions and constraints, and it is far from clear that the Fichtean subject manages to satisfy them.
One version of this objection can be framed with reference to mid-twentieth century analytic philosophy of action, where for some time it was the received view that noone can seriously intend to do something she believes to be impossible. 17 called Hypothetical Imperative: to will the end is to will the means. If I genuinely intend to achieve some end (rather than simply wishing for it, for instance) then I must also intend to do such things as are necessary conditions on bringing the end about. Only given the governance of this principle is determinate intention intelligible at all. But Kant also famously holds that 'ought' implies 'can,' and here again we might well find a kind of transcendental condition on the possibility of forming serious intentions or positing goals. The principle that 'ought' implies 'can' has been much discussed, but the core thought is that one can only have an obligation to do something if it is in fact within one's power to do it. 18 Hegel himself claims that this principle is an analytic tautology (SL 133). But now it seems that the ought-implies-can principle has a plain corollary. If 'ought' implies 'can' then 'cannot' implies 'not-ought.' More fully: let P represent "I ought to φ", where φ is in turn the name for some action. Let Q represent "I can φ." According to the Kantian maxim, P entails Q; (P → Q). But then by modus tollens (~Q → ~P) -i.e., if it is not the case that I can φ then it is not the case that I ought to.
The principle that ought implies can is often treated as a truism of moral philosophy. It is thus important to recognize just how squarely Fichtean Bad Infinitude falls afoul of it. As we have seen, the Fichtean subject is defined by its conviction that there are certain fundamental goals that 'we ought to but cannot achieve.' If 'ought' implies 'can' then the Fichtean subject can aptly be dismissed as transcendentally incoherent.
Having now provided the Hegelian with some arguments, we are faced with the task of Christians seem to take themselves to be governed by an overarching ideal or standard that is strictly impossible for them to satisfy: ought but cannot. Unfortunately, however, this will not be enough to settle the matter. It should be clear already that the Hegelian will not be content with these examples. We can expect the Hegelian retort to take the form of a dilemma. We have proposed a range of cases which purportedly illustrate infinite ideals at work in human motivation. In each case, however, the Hegelian will challenge our characterization of the case. In particular, it will be held that either we have misdescribed the actual motivations and obligations at work in these cases, or else that the goals in question are in principle attainable. We can is not in principle unattainable for Galatians and other finite human souls.
From the Hegelian perspective, this sort of dynamic can be expected to play out wherever purportedly Bad Infinite Ideals are identified. If they are really to play a role in our motivational economy they must be attainable. The athlete may say that he wants to put in the perfect performance, but what he means is that he wants to be better than all the competitors. The human rights worker might be described as working to bring an end to human rights violations, but in fact she must be striving to do all she can to alleviate and prevent them. Here it may be worth recalling that in during the first few days of the military operations initiated in response to the events of 9/11, the Bush White House formally dubbed the campaign "Operation Infinite Justice." But this characterization of the endeavor was quickly reconsidered, reportedly in response to religious critics who insisted that infinite justice was not given to men, being rather reserved as the prerogative of divine retribution. This accords with the anti-Fichtean conviction we have been exploring here: that human goals must may be demanding and stringent but must always remain attainable for limited beings like us.
At this point we seem to have reached a stalemate. The Fichtean insists that certain fundamental ideals are bad-infinite in structure: in principle unattainable and uncompleteable, giving rise to an endlessly iterated series of finite endeavors. The Hegelian denounces such ideals, claiming that this form of infinitude is schlecht -psychologically debilitating and transcendentally incoherent.
The Fichtean responds by citing what seems to be a long and rich tradition in human endeavor of just this sort of Bad Infinite struggle, which in many cases seems to be neither debilitating nor impossible.
But each of these examples is challenged, with the claim that the agents involved have been mischaracterized, perhaps even by themselves. If the quarrel is to continue along these lines then it seems that it must degenerate into a series of undecidable hermeneutic skirmishes between rival interpretations of these historical configurations of human motivation, with each side approaching the hermeneutic task with an interpretative framework that will ensure their own success.
It was in fact one of Fichte's metaphilosophical convictions that the most important philosophical disputes end in just this sort of standoff. The debate between freedom and determinism, the debate for and against idealism, the debate between the moral egoist and the proponent of the moral law … -all these debates, according to Fichte, are ultimately undecidable by rational argument alone.
In such circumstances Fichte himself characteristically and notoriously resorted to ad hominem argument, so it is perhaps not unfitting to conclude with such arguments here as well. We face a choice in these matters, a choice that in the last analysis concerns the sort of ideals that we should set for ourselves, the standards of behaviour we should aim at, and the norms by which we should measure our success. For Hegel, those goals may be infinite but they must be completeable --infinite totalities within reach of finite human beings and their institutions. Like bank managers and business consultants and accountants, the Hegelian counsels us to set realistic targets within reach of our powers, ambitions that we can then hope to satisfy. The question is whether we should follow this sensible counsel, or stand instead with Kant and Husserl and Fichte and Shakespeare and Yorick and Pauline Christians, who together share the conviction that what is distinctive about human existence and human dignity is in part the fact that we find ourselves situated with regard to demands that we can never finally fulfill, but which continue to exert their infinite authority over us. As Fichte puts it at the close of one of his notorious Sunday morning lectures:
It is part of the concept of man that his ultimate goal be unattainable and that his path thereto be infinitely long. Thus it is not man's vocation to reach this goal. But he can and he should draw nearer to it, and his true vocation qua man, that is, insofar as
